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ABSTRACT
The featural justification effect occurs when an eyewitness provides a confidence
statement at the time of lineup identification that includes reference to a facial feature or
component that aided them in their identification (Dodson & Dobolyi, 2015, 2017, 2018; Slane
& Dodson, 2019). The result of the effect, found across several manipulations, is that jurors tend
to discredit the confidence of an eyewitness that references a facial feature (such as eyes, nose,
chin) in the identification statement. The current studies examined featural justification, along
with eyewitness viewing conditions and legal safeguards. Participants were presented with either
expert testimony (study 1) or jury instruction (study 2) with the aim of sensitizing mock jurors to
eyewitness factors in the case, as well as alleviate the featural justification effect. Results of both
studies replicated the featural justification effect and found a significant main effect of viewing
condition on verdict, such that good viewing conditions resulted in more guilty verdicts than bad
viewing conditions. Other significant findings varied between the two studies. The current
findings contribute to research on the featural justification effect and include discussion of
implications for cases including eyewitness evidence.

xi

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Ronald Cotton served ten years in prison for a crime he did not commit. In 1984, an
assailant broke into Jennifer Thompson’s apartment and sexually assaulted her. Jennifer
Thompson was moderately confident at the time of the identification, but by trial, she was certain
Cotton was the culprit. The only other physical evidence supporting Cotton’s conviction was a
flashlight found in his home, similar to the one used by the assailant. The main determinant of
his sentence to life in prison, plus fifty years, was erroneous eyewitness testimony. Ten years
after his sentencing, DNA evidence proved Cotton was innocent (The Innocence Project). The
Innocence Project details numerous cases like Cotton’s where eyewitness testimony was
believed despite lack of physical evidence for a crime. Eyewitness testimony, especially
confident eyewitness testimony, remains to be heavily weighed by jurors in cases even when
there is little additional supporting evidence (Cash & Lane, 2020).
The current study aims to examine the influence of the featural justification effect and its
impact on how jurors perceive eyewitness confidence (Dodson & Dobolyi, 2015, 2017, 2018;
Slane & Dodson, 2019). The featural justification effect occurs when an eyewitness identifies a
suspect out of a lineup and in their verbal expression of confidence, the eyewitness mentions a
certain facial feature that influenced the confidence rating in their identification. Jurors tend to
discredit an eyewitness that includes this featural description in their statement, regardless of
how confident the eyewitness appears to be. To understand the factors that contribute to how
jurors perceive eyewitness confidence, I will first discuss relevant research regarding eyewitness
identification, juror perception of eyewitnesses, and how jurors perceive expert testimony and
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judicial instructions of eyewitness testimony. Then, I will discuss recent research on the featural
justification effect and address the gaps the current studies aim to address.
Eyewitness Identification
The Innocence Project reports that since 1985, DNA testing has exonerated 375
individuals who were wrongfully convicted. Of those 375, 63% were convicted based on
eyewitness misidentification (The Innocence Project). These misidentifications occurred for
varying reasons; some may have involved the lineup, photo arrays, and composite sketches. The
unfortunate reality occurs because eyewitness memory, like all memory, is malleable (Greenspan
& Loftus, 2020; Smith et al., 2019; Wells & Loftus, 2003; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986).
Post-event information from the media, friends, police, or other eyewitnesses can alter the
witness’ memory (Greenspan & Loftus, 2020; Wells & Loftus, 2003). People are typically
unaware of this unintentional altering of their memories, leading them to genuinely believe their
“revised” memory remains accurate. In addition, just as memory is malleable, so is eyewitness
confidence; post-event feedback can cause confidence to increase over time, leading jurors more
apt to believe the eyewitness and convict the suspect (Greenspan & Loftus, 2020; Leippe et al.,
2009; Smalarz & Wells, 2020; Wells & Bradfield, 1998; Wright & Skagerberg, 2007).
Traditionally, eyewitness researchers have distinguished between estimator and system
variables when examining factors influencing accurate identifications (Wells, 1978). Estimator
variables are factors the judicial system cannot control, such as the distance between the
eyewitness and the perpetrator, cross-racial identification, witness stress, and weapon presence
(Semmler et al., 2018). System variables consist of factors the judicial system can control, such
as lineup procedures and interview techniques. More recently, another set of factors has been
identified, namely reflector variables (Wells, 2020). Reflector variables are neither system nor
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estimator variables, but rather a set of factors that help investigators reflect on the likelihood of
an accurate identification by the eyewitness. For example, utterances or subjective confidence
ratings made by the eyewitness during the lineup task would be considered a reflector variable. It
is not the utterance per se that would indicate an accurate or inaccurate identification, but rather
what the utterance or confidence statement suggest about the match made between the memory
of the perpetrator and lineup identification. However, the three sets of factors do not operate
independent of one another. The presence of specific estimator and system variables may lower
the confidence of eyewitness in making an accurate identification from a lineup (Semmler et al.,
2018; Wells, 1978; Wright & McDaid, 1996). Generally, low confidence has shown to be
associated with low accuracy, and highly confident witnesses can be more accurate (Wixted et
al., 2015; Wixted & Wells, 2017, but see Smith et al., 2021). However, in the case of Ronald
Cotton, Thompson was highly confident Cotton was the assailant by the time of the trial.
Understanding factors that can lead to inflated confidence and how confidence is assessed by a
jury is necessary to prevent erroneous convictions.
Natural confidence inflation is the tendency that even in pristine lineup conditions,
eyewitness confidence tends to inflate over time after the initial identification (Douglass &
Jones, 2013). Because of this, research has stated the importance for eyewitness confidence to be
documented verbatim at the time of the lineup to be referred to later (Greenspan & Loftus, 2020,
Wells et al., 2020). Feedback given by the lineup administrator can influence eyewitness
confidence (Greenspan & Loftus, 2020; Wells & Bradfield, 1998; Wright & Skagerberg, 2007).
Typically, the feedback is given at the same time of the initial identification. In a study
examining post-identification feedback, participants were provided misinformation regarding
their confidence a week after the initial identification. In other words, if a participant had
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originally said they were 60% confident, they were told a week later they had said they were
80% confident. When a participant was told they were 80% confident instead of their original
confidence of 60%, they reported remembering being more confident than they actually stated at
the time of the identification. As suspected with the tendency of confidence inflation, even
participants in the no feedback condition showed confidence inflation a week later (Greenspan &
Loftus, 2020).
A possible explanation for increases in reported confidence may be due to the eyewitness
already having made an identification and then must justify their decision to remain consistent
(Greenspan & Loftus, 2020; Smalarz & Gary, 2020; Steblay et al., 2014). Even an unbiased
lineup procedure can still result in increased confidence over time, which demonstrates the
malleability of witness confidence. As jurors tend to believe a highly confident eyewitness to be
credible and accurate, jurors may believe an eyewitness that portrays high confidence, even if at
the time of the lineup identification their confidence was lower (Greenspan & Loftus, 2020).
Biased lineups are one factor that can lead to misidentification (Charman et al., 2018;
Leippe et al., 2009; Lindsay et al., 1991). Therefore, unbiased lineup procedures are a necessary
first step to ensure eyewitness accuracy (for a review see Wells et al., 2020). Research suggests
that witnesses lower their criteria for making an identification when the lineup has a weak
match-to-memory (Smith et al., 2019). In one study, researchers created a weak recognition by
having witnesses watch a clear or degraded video of a crime. In the following lineups, the
researchers manipulated whether the culprit was present or absent. As poor witnessing conditions
can increase false identifications, Smith and colleagues (2019) hypothesized participants who
witnessed the degraded video would have more false alarms (e.g., identifying a lineup filler) than
witnesses who watched the clear video. Mistaken identifications were significantly different
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between conditions, with 21% incorrect identifications for the clear video and 57% for the
degraded-view video. The same researchers also did a follow-up experiment where they showed
witnesses either a clear six-photo lineup or degraded photo lineup, which aimed to mimic noisy
retrieval. Results of this manipulation showed inaccurate identifications were at 39% in the clear
lineup and 73% in the degraded lineup.
The findings above suggest the level of criteria needed for a witness to select a suspect is
flexible at the time of the lineup and influenced by the lineup conditions (Smith et al., 2019).
Whether there was poor encoding (degraded video) or noisy retrieval (degraded photo lineup),
participants in these conditions had significantly higher false alarm rates than those in the control
condition. The data also suggests higher false alarm rates in the culprit-not present condition.
Having the suspect not present also lowers criteria warranted for a decision, as witnesses try to
match their memory to what is available in the environment (e.g., lineup members).
In general, it appears that low confidence implies low accuracy and high confidence
reflects high accuracy; again, this is specifically referring to confidence expressed at the initial
lineup (Wixted et al., 2015; Wixted et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2021), which is considered an
important reflector variable (Wells, 2020). Thus, initial identifications made with low confidence
most likely indicate a high likelihood for error and should be diminished in value during a jury
trial. Usually during a lineup, a witness is told to provide their confidence statement in their own
words. Even if this is documented verbatim to potentially present in court later, variability exists
in how a verbal expression of confidence is interpreted. Behrman and Davey (2001) proposed a
simple scale to interpret eyewitness expression of confidence. The scale would provide
statements for an eyewitness to fill in, such as “Although I am not positive, I think that number
____ is the person who committed the crime” (Behrman & Davey, 2001). Any empirically-tested
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method that helps jurors clearly assess the confidence at the initial identification is critical for
reducing false convictions. Regardless of whether such a method is utilized, police should record
the initial level of confidence of the eyewitness, as confidence levels may change over time
(Wixted et al., 2015). Such a change in eyewitness confidence would be a poor indicator of
accuracy and therefore, difficult for jurors to assess the veracity of an eyewitness identification.
Juror Perception of Eyewitness
Research aiming to assess how jurors interpret eyewitness evidence suggests most jurors
do not recognize the potential inaccuracies and factors that can influence faulty eyewitness
testimony (Benton et al., 2006). Jurors, judges, and law enforcement have considerable
discrepancy regarding knowledge of eyewitness accuracy when compared to experts. One survey
had participants rate “I agree” or “I disagree” on statements of lineup instructions, presentation
format, weapon focus, and other factors. Jurors disagreed with experts on 87% of the issues, or
26 out of 30 items in the questionnaire. These results show laypeople seem to have a largely
insufficient knowledge base of nuances of eyewitness identification and testimony, particularly
what factors may influence the accuracy of an identification. However, surveys like this may
overestimate participants’ knowledge, as the questions require recognition and not generating
their own information (Wise et al., 2014). In this case, the discrepancy is likely larger than
results depicted. Wise and colleagues emphasized (2014) the importance of having expert
assistance at trial to help jurors understand and interpret eyewitness evidence.
One study examining juror decision-making surrounding an eyewitness statement showed
mock jurors a videotaped trial of a robbery case (Cutler et al., 1988). Four witnesses were
presented to the mock jurors over the tape. Several factors of the conditions were manipulated
across conditions, including the disguise of the robber, weapon visibility, level of violence, and

6

biased or unbiased lineup instructions. Among all the factors, only witness confidence seemed to
influence the suspect’s perceived guilt. Despite attorneys reminding jurors about the eyewitness
conditions in their closing arguments, these factors were diminished when compared against the
witness confidence. The results suggest jurors appear to infer the most from eyewitness
confidence and are less likely to be skeptical about other conditions surrounding testimony.
In addition, research on jurors’ perception and level of processing of evidence has
examined jurors’ Need for Cognition (NFC), which is the level at which people enjoy or are
motivated to put in effort in thinking about and evaluating information (Cacioppo & Petty,
1982). Thus, some jurors may be high in NFC while others are low in NFC. Overall, jurors high
in NFC are believed to put forth more effort in studying and analyzing evidence, and recognize
areas where evidence is weaker more efficiently than jurors low in NFC (Cacioppo & Petty,
1982; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). One method proposed to help activate higher critical thinking
among jurors is to provide expert testimony to make jurors aware of eyewitness factors.
Expert Testimony
Expert testimony is one of the safeguards proposed for enhancing juror comprehension
and application of eyewitness evidence in a trial. Currently, there are mixed results on the effect
expert testimony has on jurors’ decisions (Houston et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2017; Salerno et al.,
2017; Wise & Kehn, 2020). Expert testimony regarding eyewitness evidence provides jurors
with empirical information on eyewitness confidence and factors that can result in inaccurate
eyewitness identification (Houston et al., 2013). The information provided is not generally
known and aims to increase juror comprehension and application of the testimony to the case in
question. Expert knowledge is not widely known, as even judges have shown to differ
significantly from expert knowledge on eyewitness evidence (Houston et al., 2013; Magnussen et
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al., 2008; Wise & Safer, 2004, 2010). One survey assessed ninety-nine judges with at least ten
years of experience and found them to be in agreement with expert consensus 67% of the time
(Houston et al., 2013). Over half of judges reported they felt they needed more training on
eyewitness factors. Despite this, when researchers assessed the judges’ beliefs regarding juror
capabilities, 73% of judges said the credibility of eyewitness testimony was a matter of common
sense. Moreover, 75% of judges said experts were not warranted to inform jurors on “common
sense” information.
One of the goals of expert testimony is to increase juror sensitivity to eyewitness
conditions, not just increase skepticism. When jurors appear to not be sensitized to expert
testimony, this may be due to failures of memory, knowledge, or integration of the material
(Cutler et al., 1989; Jones et al., 2017; Leippe et al., 2004). Some research has shown jurors
exposed to expert testimony evaluate witnessing and identification conditions more thoroughly
when determining the accuracy of the identification (Cutler et al., 1989). Still, other studies
suggest expert testimony can have no effect on sensitivity to eyewitness credibility (Safer et al.,
2016; Jones et al., 2020).
Previous research suggests peripheral information about an expert witness, such as their
credentials, can distract jurors form important information they are providing (Salerno, 2017).
There are two processing models for persuasion that help explain what information jurors attend
to. The elaboration model for persuasion involves deliberate and effortful processing; jurors that
are high in need for cognition (NFC) are more likely to engage in this process and attend to the
content of the expert’s testimony (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The other model of persuasion is the
heuristic systematic model; this may be employed by jurors low in NFC, who aim to process
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information quickly and heuristically (Chaiken, 1987), thus potentially leading to jurors focusing
on the credentials of the expert rather than the strength of the message when deliberating.
One study examined the influence of peripheral and central information on jury
decisions. Mock jurors heard an audiotaped version of a trial and then a cross examination of an
expert that emphasized the peripheral information (Salerno, 2017). Half of the jurors also heard
the central information as well. The researchers also manipulated the strength of the message,
having a weak and strong message from the expert witness. Jurors low in NFC were less accurate
in their decision than individuals high in NFC. Those that only heard the peripheral information
were more likely to be inconsistent with the evidence provided. Despite peripheral information
reducing accuracy among individuals, during group deliberation, members were more persuasive
arguing for the stronger case when they mentioned the credibility of the expert witness. When
used with the central information to point out a stronger case, peripheral information may have a
beneficial impact.
The interview identification eyewitness, or I-I-Eye method, can be used by expert
witnesses to help explain how to assess testimony (Pawlenko et al., 2013; Technical Working
Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999; Wise et al., 2009; Wise & Kehn, 2020). This method has
several steps, including assessing if law enforcement followed proper procedures when obtaining
information from the eyewitness, conducting the lineup, and overall quality of identification
procedures. A summary of questions is utilized to determine the accuracy of the eyewitness.
Expert testimony with I-I-Eye is more efficient than standard expert testimony because it clearly
separates three different sections of eyewitness factors to help jurors comprehend better. Wise
and Kehn (2020) examined juror decisions after reading a case with no expert testimony,
standard expert testimony, or an expert using the I-I-Eye method. Results showed participants in
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the I-I-Eye method could differentiate between strong and weak eyewitness factors better than
the other two conditions. Other studies have also found that jurors instructed with the I-I-Eye
method are more likely to find a defendant guilty when conditions were good and less likely to
convict when the conditions were poor (Safer et al., 2016).
In addition to instructional methods expert witnesses use, the timing of expert testimony
in a trial can influence whether these approaches have an impact (Leippe et al., 2004). In one
study, mock jurors read a murder trial transcript where eyewitness expert testimony was either
presented before or after the eyewitness evidence. In addition, in one condition the judge’s
instructions to the jurors reminded them of the expert testimony before evaluation, whereas in
another condition the judge did not remind jurors of the testimony. The researchers found when
the expert testimony came right after the evidence and was followed by a judge’s reminder, juror
perceptions of guilt decreased significantly. Surprisingly, when expert testimony was not
followed by a judge’s reminder, the expert testimony had no significant effect on guilt ratings.
Researchers propose having the judge remind jurors of the recent expert testimony may improve
saliency and increase desired application of the information. Thus, not only does the presence of
expert testimony matter, but possibly the timing of when it is presented within a trial.
Jury Instructions
Along with the uncertain impact of expert testimony on jurors, research is continuing to
assess the influence of jury instructions. Detailed instructions outlining important topics could
aid jurors in recognizing good and poor conditions. In one study examining how to sensitize
jurors to eyewitness factors, the authors found jurors were not influenced by instructions in their
decision-making. Even when instructions are provided with the goal to educate jurors or make
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them aware of a particular factor within the case, in many cases the information is either not
processed or is not applied (Baguley et al., 2017; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Jones et al., 2017).
Simplifying jury instructions has been proposed to improve juror comprehension and
application, as instructions consisting of legal jargon would only serve to confuse most jurors
(Baguley et al., 2017). Surprisingly, Baguley and Colleagues (2017) found reducing the amount
of information increased the severity of convictions among jurors. Reducing the conceptual
complexity within instructions led to greater application of instructions. Interestingly, when
mock jurors were given written instructions, they spent little time referring to them. Perhaps in
other research where jurors seem to not apply instructions given to them, the simple reason is
jurors do not spend time thoroughly reading the instructions. If so, the next question is how
judges can ensure jurors pay adequate attention to instructions. For this safeguard to be effective,
monitoring jurors’ attention and memory of instructions to foster application is key.
One study examined if jury instructions had an influence on suggestive identifications
shown on video (Skalon & Beaudry, 2019). Jurors watched an identification procedure that was
either non-suggestive or suggestive and were given instructions before completing case
judgements. The instructions aimed to make jurors more aware of potential problems in the
evidence and have them consider factors that could lead to an inaccurate identification. The
instructions did not improve mock jurors’ ability to discern accuracy of an identification, even
though jurors did recognize that the non-suggestive procedure was less biased than the
suggestive one.
The authors offer several explanations for why the instructions were ineffective; these
explanations are likely possible explanations in other studies where instructions seem to have no
influence (Skalon & Beaudry, 2019). One possible reason is jurors simply misunderstood the
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instructions. Another explanation is the judge did not provide sufficient support to jurors on how
to read or assess instructions. The researchers also point out the factor of timing; by the time
jurors heard the instructions at the end of a trial, they may already have constructed a strong
position of what they believe (Pennington & Hastie, 1991, 1992). Lastly, and perhaps a key
factor, is jurors may not apply the instructions because they do not process them on an
elaborative level; jurors may simply lack motivation (low in NFC) to critically process the
instructions. If this is the case, even the most detailed and relevant instructions may appear to
show no influence in decision-making.
Even with safeguards such as juror instruction and expert testimony in place, one cannot
guarantee these methods will have a significant effect on juror perception of evidence. There is
still no consistent legal safeguard for sensitizing jurors to eyewitness error (Wise et al., 2014).
Therefore, continuing research on juror perception and understanding how the presentation of
information impacts juror decision-making remains crucial. Although jurors appear to not assess
some factors critically, recent research suggests they are quite skeptical of eyewitnesses that refer
to facial features of a suspect when making an identification (Dodson & Dobolyi, 2015, 2017,
2018; Cash & Lane, 2020).
Featural Justification Effect
When an eyewitness selects someone out of a lineup, a verbal explanation of confidence
increases the variability of how people perceive their confidence and make subsequent decisions
in a trial (Dodson & Dobolyi, 2015). Jurors tend to create a mental model for an eyewitness
based on the statement the eyewitness provides during a lineup identification; previous research
by Cash and Lane (2020) has shown jurors tend to believe highly confident eyewitnesses have a
good view of the criminal and pay more attention to an event. When giving a verbal expression
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of confidence, an eyewitness may simply say “I am positive it is him” (Dodson & Dobolyi,
2015). In other cases, the eyewitness may say, “I am positive it is him. I recognize his nose.” In
the latter case, the eyewitness references a facial feature that aided in the recognition process.
This reference to a facial component of the suspect may lead to what has been termed the
featural justification effect. The featural justification effect occurs when jurors rate an eyewitness
that provides a facial cue in their statement as less confident than eyewitnesses who do not
reference features.
Perceived Diagnosticity
Dodson and Dobolyi’s (2015) account of Perceived Diagnosticity helps explain why
pointing out a distinctive feature may cause an eyewitness to be deemed as less credible. Unlike
unobservable justifications, such as “He looks like a friend of mine,” observable featural
justifications (“I recognize his chin”) may be independently assessed by jurors about how well
the jurors think the feature distinguishes the suspect from others in the lineup (Dodson &
Dobolyi, 2015). If a mock juror looks at the lineup and deems the feature to be nondistinctive, it
can lead jurors to discredit the level of confidence the eyewitness provided. This error in
cognition involves a juror assuming the eyewitness has the same experience as their own in
processing the lineup. Justifications based on familiarity, such as “I am certain. He looks
familiar,” are also deemed to be less reliable (Dobolyi & Dodson, 2018). When features are more
ambiguous and resemble the majority of people in a lineup, there appears to be room for
interpretation. As a result, providing a featural justification often results in jurors misinterpreting
the intended meaning and confidence of the eyewitness, which can directly influence conviction
rates.
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The featural justification effect does not occur when the suspect has a distinctive feature
that is widely perceived to be distinguishable, such as bushy eyebrows (Dodson & Dobolyi,
2015). In this scenario, the mock jurors deem the featural justification to be sound, as the mock
jurors themselves can visibly determine the distinctiveness of the feature. Similarly,
unobservable justifications do not appear to reduce perceived confidence. A statement followed
by an unobservable justification such as “I recognize him” does not result in decreased
credibility like observable justifications. Such a statement cannot be interpreted by jurors when
looking at the lineup. Thus, jurors perceive an eyewitness to be the most convincing when the
eyewitness provides a high confidence statement with an unobservable feature (“He looks like a
friend of mine”) that cannot be independently verified (Dobolyi & Dodson, 2018).
Featural Justification and Perceived Confidence
Dodson and Dobolyi conducted a study in 2015 on the featural justification effect. In
Experiment 2, confidence statements were either confidence only, confidence and featural
justification, or confidence and unobservable justification. The race of the perpetrator was either
black or white. In addition, confidence statements were high or moderate. Participants viewed
eight lineups, four highly confident and four moderately confident. Featural justifications and
unobservable justifications were manipulated as well. An example of a featural justification
statement used is “His hair looks familiar” and an example of an unobservable justification is “I
remember him.” The lineup contained six photos with the target outlined by a red box, with the
eyewitness’ confidence statement underneath. Participants were asked to turn the verbal
confidence statement into a numeric value. Results showed significant variability in how
eyewitnesses were perceived when they gave featural justifications, compared to a confidence
only statement or unobservable justification. In experiment 3, the authors found support that the
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featural justification effect occurred, irrespective of lineup modality (e.g., simultaneous vs.
sequential).
As stated previously, a common way an eyewitness provides a confidence statement is by
verbal expression at the lineup identification (Dodson & Dobolyi, 2015). Verbal expressions of
confidence can be interpreted differently among individuals. Despite this problem, it is quite
common for the witness to provide a verbal expression of confidence rather than giving a clear
percentage, such as “I am 80% confidence it is him.” Dodson and Dobolyi examined if there
would be a significant difference in how jurors perceive numeric confidence statements (2017).
As verbal expressions of confidence are more common, and these often lead to misinterpretation,
a proposed solution would be for the eyewitness to provide a numeric statement; providing jurors
with an exact confidence value of the eyewitness. The authors hypothesized a concrete
confidence percentage in a statement would lessen the featural justification effect. The
experiment had three different justifications – confidence only, confidence plus featural, and
confidence plus unobservable justification. The type of expression of confidence was either
verbal or numeric. For the numeric conditions, the eyewitness reported being 80% or 100%
confident. Mock jurors viewed a six-photo lineup with the confidence statement underneath the
target’s photo and were asked to complete a perceived guilt scale. Surprisingly, even when an
eyewitness clearly expressed their confidence numerically, adding featural justifications to the
statement such as “I’m 100% certain. I recognize his nose,” led to a decrease in perceived
confidence when compared to a statement of “I’m 100% certain.”
If even in conditions where the eyewitness provided a numeric value of confidence,
jurors still decreased perceived confidence levels, perhaps jurors were assessing eyewitness
confidence and accuracy separately (Dodson & Dobolyi, 2017). In other words, even if an
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eyewitness displays high confidence, a juror may perceive the eyewitness to be less accurate.
Following this idea, the researchers conducted another experiment in which participants were
asked to judge the accuracy of the statement instead of rating perceived guilt of the target. They
viewed a six-photo lineup with a confidence statement and were told, “given the above
expression of certainty, how accurate is the eyewitness’ identification?” Following was a sixpoint numeric scale from “not at all accurate” or 0% to “completely accurate” at 100%. In the
conditions where the eyewitness statement included a featural justification effect, jurors rated the
eyewitness as roughly 25% less accurate compared to the confidence only and unobservable
justification conditions. This finding suggests even when eyewitness confidence is made
explicitly clear to jurors, perceived accuracy may be lower when a featural justification is
present.
Clearly the featural justification effect can be quite powerful, as it has been shown to be
present in a variety of studies. Just how powerful is the featural justification effect and its
influence on jury assessment? A recent study by Slane and Dodson (2019) examined if having
two eyewitnesses provide a featural cue would still lead to similar reductions in confidence
ratings. Researchers were interested to see if the strength of two eyewitnesses would diminish
the featural justification effect. In one condition, two eyewitnesses referred to different features
of a suspect, and in another condition the witnesses both referred to the same feature of the
suspect. Results showed jurors rated suspects as more likely to be guilty when the same featural
cue was referenced (“I recognize his nose”) twice than when different features were mentioned
(“I recognize his nose” and “I recognize his eyebrows”). Still, two eyewitnesses referring to the
same cue led to less guilty convictions than if the confidence statement had no reference to facial
features. The strength of two eyewitnesses identifying a target sill is diminished by the reference

16

of facial features, as jurors appear to discredit the accuracy. The researchers emphasize the need
for more research on when and how jurors weigh evidence from single eyewitnesses compared to
multiple eyewitnesses.
Thus far, there is strong evidence that referencing a facial feature leads to a decrease in
perceived confidence and accuracy, even when the eyewitness statement includes a numeric
rating of confidence (Dodson & Dobolyi, 2015, 2017, 2018). Cash and Lane (2020) explored
other factors that may be impacted by featural justifications, such as juror perceptions of an
eyewitness’ clarity of image, attention, and time taken to make identification. Participants were
asked to rate how influential they thought these factors were on the witness statement based on a
Likert scale; the five-point scale ranged from “not influential” to “very influential.” The lineup
conditions were varied by showing no lineup, a distinctive lineup, or a nondistinctive lineup
along with the expressions of confidence. Unique facial features were rated as more important
when there was a distinctive lineup, suggesting jurors are more likely to attribute the unique
feature to confidence rather than other factors. One factor, clarity of image, was rated lower in
nondistinctive lineup conditions with a featural cue. Similarly, attention of the eyewitness had
reduced ratings when featural cues were mentioned. Based on this research, if an eyewitness
provides a featural justification in their statement, jurors may interpret the eyewitness had poorer
viewing conditions than an eyewitness that does not mention a featural cue.
The results of this study suggest if a witness is highly confident, people infer the witness
had a good view of the suspect, paid attention during the crime, has a reliable memory, and will
identify the suspect from the lineup more quickly (Cash & Lane, 2020). An interesting finding
emerged in that even when no lineup was shown, commenting on a facial feature reduced ratings
for time attending to crime and amount of time taken to pick suspect from the lineup. Since no
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lineup was shown, jurors did not have the chance to independently assess whether the feature
was distinctive or not. The researchers hypothesize this occurred because the type of justification
was manipulated within subjects; as a result, the added featural justification may have made
jurors more aware of the addition and compared it to the confidence only condition. If further
research replicates this result, then the mere mention of a facial feature, even in the absence of
opportunity for comparison, could lower perceived confidence. The researchers point out
although the effect was still present, the effect was weaker in this instance than when a lineup
was shown. Based on these findings, the featural justification effect may be present even when
jurors do not see the physical lineup to compare uniqueness for themselves. Research continues
to show how highly influential this effect can be on jurors’ inferences.
Current Studies
The primary goal of the current studies is to investigate potential conditions to reduce or
eliminate the featural justification effect. Research by Dodson and Dobolyi (2015, 2017, 2018)
has shown across various manipulations, eyewitness confidence statements accompanied with
featural justifications consistently produce the featural justification effect, leading to a decrease
in perceived confidence of the eyewitness and lower guilt ratings. Research suggests jurors form
a mental model of an eyewitness’ attention span, clarity of image, and distance from the target
based on the eyewitness’ identification statement (Cash & Lane, 2020). Thus, jurors presented
with an eyewitness statement, which includes a featural justification, tend to believe the
eyewitness had less time to view the target and rate the clarity of image as lower (Cash & Lane,
2020). The current studies manipulate whether mock jurors are told the eyewitness had an
overall good/poor viewing condition to determine if explicitly providing the actual viewing
conditions (rather than coming to one’s own inferences) influences perceived confidence. In
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addition, the current studies aimed to explore potential safeguards to reduce the featural
justification effect. Jury instructions are one type of safeguard that have been proposed; previous
research shows mixed results on whether juror instructions are effective in increasing sensitivity
to eyewitness factors in jurors (Pennington & Hastie, 1991, 1992; Skalon & Beaudry, 2019).
Another safeguard explored was expert testimony; providing jurors with a transcript of an expert
witness’ account was hypothesized to decrease or eliminate the strength of the featural
justification effect. Thus, the current studies advanced research on the featural justification effect
by examining the effects of viewing conditions and safeguards to attempt to minimize the
strength of the featural justification effect.
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CHAPTER II
STUDY I
In Study 1, I investigated the main and interactive effects of justification type, viewing
conditions, and expert testimony. Past research suggests eyewitness statements that include a
featural justification will be rated as less confident and result in lower perceived guil t judgements
than unobservable justifications or no justification (Dodson & Dobolyi, 2015, 2017, 2018). Thus,
the aim of Study 1 was to examine the impact of eyewitness viewing conditions and eyewitness
expert testimony on the featural justification effect. Previous research has not examined whether
expert testimony can have an impact on how jurors perceive confidence statements with featural
justifications but could potentially provide a procedural safeguard. Hence, I examined if a
featural justification resulting from good eyewitness viewing conditions leads to lower perceived
confidence ratings. In addition, I explored if expert testimony, specifically educating jurors on
featural justifications, results in a reduced featural justification effect than previously found.
Hypotheses.
Main Effects: Featural Justification statements would lead to lower confidence ratings
and reduction of guilty verdict ratings compared to all other conditions. Good viewing conditions
would result in higher confidence and guilt ratings than poor viewing conditions. Enhanced
expert testimony with featural justification should lead to a smaller reduction in perceived
confidence and guilt ratings compared to standard expert testimony. No specific predictions were
made for the enhanced with featural compared to the enhanced expert testimony due to the
exploratory nature of these variables in the current study.
Two-Way Interactions:
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A two-way interaction between featural justifications and viewing conditions, such that
featural justifications with good viewing conditions would result in higher confidence and guilty
verdict ratings than featural justifications made in bad viewing conditions was expected. The
potential three-way interaction between featural justification, viewing conditions, and expert
testimony was explored without prior hypotheses.
METHOD
Participants and Design
In total, Study 1 consisted of 376 individuals recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
who completed the study through Qualtrics and were compensated $0.50 for their participation
(Buhrmester et al., 2016). Of these, 26 participants were excluded for failing attention checks.
An additional four participants were excluded for failing manipulation checks. A filter variable
was created to assess recall of four facts of the vignette. Seven participants were removed for
having recall of less than three out of the four statements correct. Thus, a total of 339 (age range
18-75, Mage = 44.23, SD = 13.69; 203 females; 272 White) participants were included for
analyses. Each participant in Study 1 was randomly assigned to one of eighteen conditions in a 3
(type of justification: none vs. unobservable vs. featural) x 2 (viewing condition: good vs. bad) x
3 (expert testimony: standard vs. enhanced vs. enhanced + featural justification) factorial design.
Materials
The current study did not present participants with a six-photo lineup, which has typically
been used in Dodson and Dobolyi’s research (2015, 2017, 2018). Instead, Cash and Lane (2020)
found, albeit a smaller effect, the featural justification effect occurred even when mock jurors did
not view a photo lineup to make featural comparisons.
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The confidence statements of the eyewitness were conveyed consistently as high
confidence (see Appendix B). These statements were modeled after Dodson and Dobolyi (2015)
and were I am positive it is him. Unobservable justifications consisted of the statement, He looks
like someone I know. Featural justifications included the statement, I recognize his nose.
The case vignette was a summary of a neighbor on a run at night who witnessed the
suspect leaving his neighbor’s house while they were away on vacation (see Appendix A).
Several variables were manipulated to create a good eyewitness viewing condition and a bad
eyewitness viewing condition. In both the good and bad eyewitness viewing conditions, the
suspect was reported to be twenty feet away from the witness and the witness told the officer he
had 20/20 vision. In the bad viewing condition, the suspect was wearing a hoodie, had a weapon,
was seen in poor lighting, and was in view of the witness for about two minutes. In the good
viewing condition, the suspect did not have a hoodie or weapon, was seen in good lighting and
was in view of the witness for five minutes.
In Study 1, the written transcript included expert testimony (see Appendix C). Expert
testimony was either standard, enhanced, or enhanced plus featural. Standard expert testimony
detailed eyewitness factors that can lead to inaccurate memory in general. Enhanced expert
testimony included general information on memory, with the addition of discussion of system
and estimator variables. Lastly, enhanced + expert testimony included the information in the
enhanced version, with the addition of a brief discussion of featural justifications. In creating the
expert testimony transcripts, research by Brodsky et al. (2009) on credibility of an expert witness
was followed. When modeling the expert witness transcript, informal speech was prioritized over
technical information, and the expert witnesses used “we” or “us” when discussing members of
the scientific community.
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Participants also completed several manipulation checks, assessing the effectiveness of
the safeguard, eyewitness factors relating to the case, and a series of true/false statements to
assess participants’ memory for the case (see Appendix G). Participants then completed a short
demographic questionnaire (see Appendix G). Lastly, several attention check questions were
randomly included in the study.
Dependent Variables
Confidence of Eyewitness
Perceived confidence of eyewitness was measured on a 100-point scale (see Appendix
E). Participants were asked to “translate the eyewitness’s verbal expression of confidence into a
number” after reading the eyewitness confidence statement. The scale ranged from 0 (not at all
certain) to 100 (completely certain), modeled after Dodson and Dobolyi’s perceived confidence
scale (2018).
Verdict
Participants were asked to render a verdict for the case. Participants were given the
option of “not guilty” or “guilty.”
Confidence in Verdict
Following rendering a verdict, participants were asked to rate how confident they were in
their verdict. The 9-point Likert scale used to rate confidence in verdict (modeled after Wise &
Kehn, 2020) ranged from “not at all confident” to “very confident” (see Appendix F).
Procedure
Study 1 was conducted online through Qualtrics. Participants were recruited to take part
in a study on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were presented with a vignette describing
the crime. Participants then read the confidence statement provided by the eyewitness and asked
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to rate the confidence of the eyewitness. Following these two assessments, participants were
presented with one of the three version of expert testimony. Participants then rendered a verdict
as well as completing a questionnaire asking specifics about the case and the expert. Participants
then completed a manipulation check and demographic questionnaire after which they were
thanked and compensated for their participation.
RESULTS
Case Judgements
Perceived Eyewitness Confidence. Aligning with previous research, it was hypothesized
that confidence statements made with featural justification would result in significantly lower
perceived confidence than a confidence-only statement. The data supports this hypothesis as a
one-way ANOVA revealed viewing conditions as a significant predictor, F(2, 336) = 5.52, p =
.004. The confidence only condition had a significant higher rating (M = 87.82, SE = 1.59) than
both confidence and unobservable statement (M = 80.98, SE = 1.59) and confidence and featural
statement (M = 81.81, SE = 1.58). No difference was detected between the confidence and
unobservable statement condition and the confidence and featural statement condition. This
supports the hypothesis and previous research suggesting that mock jurors rate an eyewitness
who simply states their confidence level as more confident than other variations of expressed
confidence including featural justifications.
A series of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVAs) was conducted to test the main
effects of independent variables on ratings of eyewitness confidence. It was hypothesized that
good viewing conditions would result in higher ratings of confidence than poor viewing
conditions. The hypothesis was not supported by the data, as the good viewing (M = 84.10, SE =
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1.32) and bad viewing condition (M = 82.95, SE = 1.30) did not significantly differ in predicting
mock jurors’ confidence ratings, F(1, 337) = .383, p = .537.
Contrary to my hypothesis, expert testimony was not a significant predictor of perceived
eyewitness confidence, F(2, 336) = .18, p = .84.
Verdict. One preliminary hypothesis was that bad viewing conditions would reduce
guilty verdicts compared to good viewing conditions. A logistic regression was conducted to
determine if viewing conditions was a significant predictor of verdict decision. There was a
significant association between viewing condition and verdict, χ2[1] = 12.95, p < .001. With
good viewing conditions, 70 participants (41.9%) voted not guilty, while 97 participants (58.0%)
voted guilty. This trend was reversed for participants in the bad viewing condition; 106
participants (61.6%) voted not guilty, and 66 participants (38.4%) voted guilty. In terms of odds
ratios, participants in the good viewing condition were 2.23 times more likely to vote guilty than
those in the bad viewing condition. Results confirm the initial hypothesis that bad viewing
conditions would result in a reduction of guilty verdicts.
Further, it was hypothesized confidence with featural statements would lead to lower
guilty verdicts than the confidence only and confidence with unobservable statement conditions.
There was not a significant association between the confidence conditions and verdict, χ2[2] =
.64, p > .05. There was also not a significant association between expert testimony and verdict
decision, χ2[2] = 1.60, p > .05.
Confidence in Verdict. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test the predictors on
confidence in verdict. There was no significant main effect of viewing condition, F(1, 336) =
1.86 , p = .17, no significant effect of confidence condition, F(2, 336) = .22, p = .80 , or expert
testimony on mock jurors’ confidence in verdicts, F(2, 336) = .15, p = .86.
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Interaction Effects
Two-Way Interactions. One hypothesis for two-way interactions was featural
justifications made in good viewing conditions would have higher confidence and more guilty
ratings than featural justifications made in bad viewing conditions. The other hypothesis was that
enhanced expert testimony with featural justification would lead to a smaller reduction in
perceived confidence and guilty verdicts compared to standard expert testimony with featural
justification. Contrary to the hypotheses, overall effects suggests there was not a significant twoway interaction among any combination of the three variables, p > .05.
Three Way Interactions. Potential three-way interactions were exploratory and were not
hypothesized prior to analysis. Overall effects suggest a significant interaction between all three
independent variables on confidence in verdict ratings, F(4, 321) = 3.60, p = .007. Examining the
pairwise comparisons, a significant difference of confidence in verdict was found between the
conditions of confidence only and enhanced + expert with viewing conditions, p = .002.
Participants presented with a confidence only statement in a good viewing condition with
enhanced + expert testimony (M= 7.05, SE = .41) had significantly higher confidence in verdict
than participants in a confidence only in bad viewing condition with enhanced + expert
testimony (M = 5.18, SE = .43).
There was also a significant interaction between confidence + featural statement and
enhanced expert with the two viewing conditions, p = .014. Participants presented with
confidence + featural in the good viewing condition with enhanced expert (M = 6.95, SE = .41)
reported significantly higher confidence in verdict ratings than those in confidence + featural
with bad viewing condition and enhanced expert testimony (M = 5.50, SE = .42).
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There was not a significant three-way interaction between the remaining conditions on
confidence in verdict, p > .05.
Eyewitness Factors
Six eyewitness factors were proposed to participants, rated on a 9-point Likert scale from
1 = Leads to False Identification to 9 = Leads to Accurate Identification. A one-way ANOVA
was conducted to see if Expert testimony condition was a significant predictor on the ratings.
Expert testimony was a significant predictor on weapon present, F(2, 336) = 39.04, p < .001.
Participants in the standard expert testimony condition rated weapon presence higher (M = 5.01,
SE = .18) than enhanced (M = 2.91, SE = .22) and enhanced + (M = 2.91, SE = .18). Expert
testimony was a significant predictor on “short duration,” F(2, 336) = 9.80, p <.001). Those in
the standard expert testimony condition had significantly higher ratings (M = 3.48, SE = .17)
than enhanced versions (M = 2.60, SE = .18; M = 2.56, SE = .15). Additionally, expert testimony
was a significant predictor for the rating of “suspect wearing a hoodie,” F(2, 336) = 4.00, p =
.02. Standard expert testimony resulted in significantly higher ratings (M = 3.20, SE = .18) than
enhanced expert testimony (M = 2.54, SE = .18).
Expert testimony was not a significant predictor for participants’ ratings on poor lighting,
short distance, and good vision. Overall, across all three conditions of Expert testimony, mock
jurors rated good vision (M= 7.60, SD = 1.32) and a short distance from suspect (M = 7.13, SD =
1.89) as more likely to lead to accurate identification. Participants overall means for weapon
present (M = 3.62, SD = 2.29), poor lighting (M = 2.37, SD = 1.82), short duration (M = 2.88, SD
= 1.81), and suspect wearing a hoodie (M = 2.81, SD = 1.88) were rated more towards leading to
false identification. These overall means suggest that mock jurors were sensitive to the different
eyewitness factors that could impact identification.
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Participants were asked to rate the effectiveness of the Expert testimony provided, with a
Likert scale ranging from 1 = Not Very Effective to 9 = Very Effective. Between the three expert
conditions of standard (M = 6.82, SD = 1.70), enhanced (M= 7.23, SD = 1.76, and enhanced + (M
= 6.90, SD = 1.72) there was not a significant difference in effectiveness ratings (p > .05).
DISCUSSION
Study 1 examined the effects of eyewitness confidence, viewing condition, and expert
testimony on three dependent variables: perceived witness confidence, verdict, and confidence in
verdict. The overall results of the study are mixed in terms of the hypotheses.
First, it was hypothesized that confidence statements with featural justification would
lead to lower perceived confidence ratings than confidence only statements. This hypothesis was
supported by the results, as participants who read an eyewitness confidence only statement rated
the eyewitness as significantly more confident than an eyewitness that provided a featural
justification. This replicates past research by Dodson and Dobolyi (2015, 2016) that consistently
finds this effect when comparing a confidence only statement and a featural justification
statement. There was not a significant difference between the unobservable confidence st atement
and the featural; this also is similar to past research findings that report no significant difference
between these two variations.
Second, it was hypothesized that featural justification confidence statements would result
in fewer guilty verdicts than other confidence conditions. Past findings suggest that participants
tend to find an eyewitness who provides a featural justification as less confident; it was expected
that this would translate to fewer guilty verdicts. However, this was not supported by the
analysis. One possible explanation for this is that when deciding a verdict, participants may have
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given more weight to whether the viewing condition was good or bad, rather than remembering
the eyewitness statement presented earlier.
In addition, it was hypothesized that viewing condition would have a main effect on
verdict and confidence in verdict. A good viewing condition was hypothesized to result in more
guilty verdicts and higher confidence in these verdicts than a bad viewing condition. There was a
significant main effect of viewing condition on guilty verdicts; participants who read about a
good viewing case vignette were more likely to vote guilty than participants who read about a
bad viewing vase vignette. These results suggest participants were sensitive to this information
and took the eyewitness viewing factors (e.g., lighting, vision, weapon present) into account
when making their decision. There was not a significant effect of viewing condition on
confidence in verdict, however. Mock jurors may be confident in their decision regardless of
some of the case facts, as people tend to overstate their confidence.
Although it was hypothesized that expert testimony would influence the main dependent
variables, there was no effect of expert testimony in Study 1. As previous research suggests
(Safer et al., 2016; Skalon & Beaudry, 2019), there are several possibilities for the null findings.
One potential explanation is that mock jurors did not take the time to read this information
thoroughly. Participants may have read through the vignette but did not thoroughly encode the
information to utilize in their decision-making. Another reason could be that the value of
information provided in the three different versions of expert testimony was not substantially
different. Between the three versions of expert testimony, a large portion of the vignette
contained the same information, describing eyewitness identification factors. Participants may
not have processed some of the specific information enough to impact their case judgements.
Specifically, the differences between standard and the enhanced version was that enhanced
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expert testimony elaborated on what factors make up a generally good/bad eyewitness viewing
condition. Then, enhanced and enhanced + expert testimony differed with enhanced + expert
testimony having an additional paragraph addressing the featural justification effect. If jurors
were not processing the information thoroughly or giving adequate attention to the information
covered in the expert testimony, the result of not having a significant difference between any of
these conditions would be plausible.
There were no significant two-way effects of the independent variables on participants’
ratings. Three-way interactions were left exploratory in the study. Two significant three-way
interactions were found; the first was a significant interaction on confidence in verdict.
Participants in the condition of confidence only and enhanced + expert differed in confidence in
verdict between the two viewing conditions. Participants in good viewing conditions had higher
confidence in verdict than those in the bad viewing condition. These results suggest that even
when an eyewitness had a confidence only statement (the confidence statement mock jurors rate
with the highest confidence), mock jurors were sensitive to the viewing conditions, recognizing
that a bad viewing condition may not be as reliable.
There was also a significant interaction between confidence + featural statement and
enhanced expert with the two viewing conditions on confidence in verdict; participants in good
viewing conditions reported higher confidence in their verdict than those in bad viewing
conditions. Results from this interaction and the previous significant interaction suggest that
mock jurors are the most sensitive to the predictor variable of viewing condition; significant
effects are found between confidence in verdict for the good and bad viewing conditions. A
potential reason for this is there is more education on eyewitness viewing conditions than the
different variations of eyewitness confidence statements and how to interpret them.
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From the findings of Study 1, there was no significant difference of an unobservable
confidence statement versus featural justification statement on any of the dependent variables;
this also aligns with previous research (Dodson & Dobolyi, 2015) that has excluded the
unobservable condition from future analyses to focus on confidence only versus featural
conditions. Given the findings, Study 2 did not include the unobservable confidence condition. In
addition, given that expert testimony had no significant main effects in Study 1, the use of jury
instruction in Study 2 was limited to two conditions instead of three (standard vs. enhanced).
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CHAPTER III
STUDY II
Study 2 examined the main and interactive effects of justification type, viewing
conditions, and jury instructions. Study 2 was similar to Study 1 in that it also provided jurors
with the viewing conditions (good vs. bad) of the eyewitness; however, instead of expert
testimony, mock jurors were provided with instructions on how to accurately interpret
expressions of confidence. Previous research on the featural justification effect has not examined
if jury instructions can minimize the reduced ratings of confidence for statements with featural
justifications. Study 2 utilized a 2 (type of justification: unobservable vs. featural) x 2 (viewing
condition: poor vs. good) x 2 (jury instruction: standard vs. enhanced) factorial design.
Hypotheses.
Main Effects. To replicate the effects found in Study 1, one hypothesis was confidence
conditions would result in a main effect on perceived confidence of the eyewitness; confidence
only statements would result in higher perceived confidence than confidence with featural
statements. In addition, it was hypothesized that viewing condition would influence verdict, such
that good viewing condition would be more likely to result in guilty verdicts than bad viewing
conditions. There was no proposed hypothesis for confidence in verdict; Study 1 found no
significant main effect on participants’ confidence in verdict.
Jury instructions provided were either standard or enhanced instructions. Standard
instructions included a discussion of the need for proof beyond a reasonable doubt to reach a
decision. Enhanced jury instructions included additional information on potential errors in
eyewitness memory. It was hypothesized that enhanced jury instruction would lead to a reduction
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of the number of guilt ratings compared to standard instructions, and that enhanced jury
instruction would result in a reduction of confidence in verdict.
Interactions. As there were no significant two-way interactions in Study 1, the potential
two-way and three-way interactions for this study were exploratory.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 225 participants were recruited for Study 2 through Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk and completed the study through Qualtrics. Of these, eight participants were excluded for
failing attention checks. In addition, one participant was excluded for failing several
manipulation checks. A filter was created to code recall for four manipulation checks. This filter
eliminated an additional fourteen participants. Thus, a total of 203 (age range 21-80, Mage =
43.56, SD = 13.13; 125 females; 162 White) participants’ data was analyzed. Each participant in
Study 2 was randomly assigned to one of eight conditions in a 2 (viewing condition: bad vs.
good) x 2 (type of justification: none vs. featural) x 2 (jury instruction: standard vs. enhanced)
factorial design. To compensate participation, each participant received $ .50 for completion.
Materials
The materials used in Study 2 were similar to Study 1; the case vignette for good viewing
and bad viewing conditions was identical to Study 1. From analysis of Study 1, Study 2 removed
one confidence condition. The confidence statement with an unobservable justification was
removed because there were no significant findings that differed from this condition and the
confidence with featural statement. Therefore, Study 2 had two confidence conditions of the
confidence only and the confidence with featural. Study 2 used two types of jury instruction
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(standard vs enhanced) for the safeguard presented instead of expert testimony provided in Study
1.
The jury instructions were modeled after Wise and Kehn (2020) and proceeded the case
vignette (see Appendix D). Standard juror instructions reminded jurors about the need for proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and that it was up to them to decide based on the eyewitness
testimony, whether there was substantial proof for guilt. Enhanced juror instructions consisted of
explaining proof beyond a reasonable doubt and potential inaccuracies of eyewitness memory.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables to be analyzed were identical to those of Study 1: perceived
confidence of eyewitness, verdict, and confidence in verdict. There were also some questions
relating to demographics and manipulation checks.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Study 1 except jury instructions were introduced instead
of expert testimony. Jury instructions were provided after the eyewitness confidence statements.
RESULTS
Case Judgements
Perceived Eyewitness Confidence. A series of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVAs)
were conducted to test the main effects of independent variables on ratings of eyewitness
confidence. One hypothesis was that good viewing conditions would result in higher ratings of
confidence than bad viewing conditions. The results supported this hypothesis, F(1, 201) = 3.80,
p = .053. Eyewitnesses that witnessed the event in good viewing conditions were rated as more
confident (M = 88.52, SE = 1.75) than those that witnessed the event in bad viewing conditions
(M = 83.72, SE = 1.74).
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Results also revealed a main effect of confidence statement on perceived witness
confidence, F(1, 201) = 7.45, p = .007. Eyewitnesses who provided a confidence only statement
were perceived to be more confident (M = 89.55, SE = 1.76) than eyewitnesses who provided a
featural justification (M = 82.89, SE = 1.70). This replicates findings from Study 1 and supports
the featural justification effect.
Verdict. A priority hypothesis was that bad viewing conditions would reduce guilty
verdicts compared to good viewing conditions. A logistic regression was conducted to determine
if viewing condition was a significant predictor of verdict decision. There was a significant
association between viewing condition and verdict, χ2[1] = 25.10, p < .001. With good viewing
conditions, 36 participants (35.64%) voted not guilty, while 65 participants (64.36%) voted
guilty. This trend was reversed for participants in the bad viewing conditions; 73 participants
(71.57%) voted not guilty, and 29 participants (28.43%) voted guilty. In terms of odds ratios,
participants in good viewing conditions were 4.55 times more likely to vote guilty than those in
bad viewing conditions. These results support the initial hypothesis that bad viewing conditions
would result in a reduction of guilty verdicts compared to good viewing conditions.
The potential effects of jury instruction on the dependent variables was left exploratory,
given the mixed results on the effectiveness of jury instruction in past research, as well as no
effect of expert testimony in Study 1. There was a significant association between jury
instruction and verdict, χ2[1] = 3.86, p = .049. For participants provided with standard jury
instructions, 49 participants (47.57%) voted not guilty, while 54 participants (52.42%) voted
guilty. For those provided with enhanced jury instructions, 60 participants (60.0%) voted not
guilty, while 40 (40.0%) voted guilty. Participants provided with enhanced jury instructions were
1.65 times more likely to reach a not guilty verdict.
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Further, it was hypothesized confidence with featural statements would lead to lower
guilty verdicts than the confidence only and confidence with unobservable statement conditions.
There was not a significant association between the confidence conditions and verdict, χ 2[1] =
1.56, p > .05.
Confidence in Verdict. A series of one-way analysis of variance were conducted to test
the predicted effects of the three independent variables on mock jurors’ confidence in their
verdict. It was hypothesized that good viewing conditions would result in higher confidence in
verdict than decisions made from a case with bad viewing conditions. Results support this
hypothesis, F(1, 195) = 4.33, p = .039. Good viewing conditions resulted in a higher reported
confidence in verdict (M = 6.86, SE = .17) than bad viewing conditions, (M = 6.37, SE = .17).
Confidence conditions did not have a significant effect on confidence in verdict, F(1,
195) = .60, p = .440. The type of jury instruction did not have a significant effect on confidence
in verdict, (F(1, 195) = 3.04, p = .083.
Interactions Effects.
Two-way Interactions. One hypothesis was featural justifications made with good
eyewitness viewing conditions would have higher confidence and more guilty ratings than
featural justifications made with poor eyewitness viewing conditions. There was a significant
interaction between viewing condition and confidence condition on mock jurors’ confidence in
verdict, F(1, 195) = 5.07, p = .026. There was a significant difference between ratings of
confidence in verdict for confidence only statements and the two viewing conditions. Confidence
only statements with good viewing resulted in higher confidence in verdict (M = 7.21, SE = .24)
than confidence only statements made in bad viewing conditions (M = 6.50, SE = .23). Featural
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statements made in good viewing conditions (M = 6.50, SE = .23) did not differ significantly
from featural statements made in bad viewing conditions (M = 6.54, SE = .23).
In addition, one hypothesis was enhanced jury instruction with featural justification
would lead to a smaller reduction in perceived confidence and guilty verdicts compared to
standard expert testimony with featural justification. Contrary to the hypotheses, overall effects
suggests there was not a significant two-way interaction among any combination of the three
variables, p > .05.
Three-way Interactions. The potential three-way interactions were exploratory for
Study 2. Overall results suggest there were no significant three-way interaction between
confidence type, viewing condition, and jury instruction, p > .05.
Eyewitness Factors
Six eyewitness factors were proposed to participants rated on a 9-point Likert scale from
1 = Leads to False Identification to 9 = Leads to Accurate Identification. A one-way ANOVA
was conducted to see if jury instruction condition was a significant predictor on the ratings. Jury
instruction had an effect on ratings of weapon present, F(1, 201) = 27.68, p < .001. Those with
enhanced jury instruction rated weapon present as more likely to lead to false identifications (M
= 3.24, SE = .16) than those given standard jury instructions (M = 4.78, SE = .20).
Jury instructions had a main effect on ratings for short duration of crime, F(1, 201) =
7.11, p = .008. Participants with enhanced jury instruction rated this concept as less likely to lead
to accurate identification (M = 3.26, SE = .21) than those with standard jury instructions (M =
4.01, SE = .19. In addition, there was a main effect of instruction on the rating of suspect wearing
a hoodie, F(1, 201) = 11.16, p < .001. Enhanced jury instruction resulted in ratings more towards
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less likely to lead to accurate identification (M = 2.63, SE = .17) than standard instructions (M =
3.47, SE = .18).
Jury instructions did not affect ratings on poor lighting, short distance, or good vision, p
> .05. Although not significant, for good vision, both jurors given standard jury instruction (M =
7.64, SE = .13) and enhanced (M = 7.58, SE = .12) rated good vision as more likely to lead to
accurate identification.
Participants were asked to rate the effectiveness of the jury instruction provided, with a
Likert scale ranging from 1 = Not Very Effective to 9 = Very Effective. Between the two jury
instruction conditions, there was not a significant difference in effectiveness ratings ( p > .05).
DISCUSSION
Study 2 examined the effects of eyewitness confidence, viewing conditions, and jury
instruction on perceived witness confidence, verdict, and confidence in verdict. Several
hypotheses were supported by the results of Study 2.
First, the hypothesis that confidence only conditions would result in higher perceived
confidence than confidence statements with featural justifications was supported by the results of
Study 2. This finding replicates results from Study 1 that find the featural justification effect to
have a consistent influence on perceived ratings of eyewitness confidence. Mock jurors
consistently appear to find eyewitnesses that provide less explanation in their statement to be
more confident than eyewitnesses who reference a specific facial feature.
In addition, the hypothesis that viewing condition would have a main effect was
predicted. Study 1 and study 2 found this same effect to be present, in that mock jurors who read
a case vignette about good viewing conditions were more likely to vote guilty than participants
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who read about bad viewing conditions. Jurors appear to be sensitive to these eyewitness factors
and consider this relevant information when rendering a verdict.
There was a main effect of viewing condition on ratings of perceived confidence.
Participants who read the vignette set in a good viewing condition were more likely to rate the
eyewitness as higher in confidence than mock jurors that read about a bad viewing condition.
This suggests that the mock jurors were sensitive to the eyewitness viewing conditions even
before being educated on them with the jury instructions, since jurors were asked to rate how
confident the eyewitness was immediately following the eyewitness statement, prior to reading
the jury instructions.
In addition to the effect of viewing condition on verdict, jury instruction had a main
effect on verdict decisions. Results suggest enhanced jury instruction led to an increase in notguilty verdicts compared to standard jury instructions. While standard jury instructions focused
on what could be deemed as reasonable doubt, enhanced jury instruction went beyond this to
explain factors that make up a good versus bad viewing conditions. Based on the results, jurors
appear to have processed the jury instruction and applied the information when deciding the
case.
There was also a significant effect of viewing condition on confidence in verdict. Mock
jurors presented with a bad viewing condition reported lower confidence in verdict than mock
jurors presented with a good viewing condition. From these results, it appears mock jurors are
sensitive to the factors in the viewing conditions and are able to judge to some degree whether
the eyewitness’ identification is reliable.
The one significant interaction effect for Study 2 was between confidence justification
and viewing condition. Confidence only statements made in good viewing conditions resulted in
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higher confidence in verdict ratings than confidence only statements made in bad viewing
conditions. Results examining the effect of confidence type suggest confidence only statements
are deemed to be the most confident by mock jurors. In addition, if a confidence statement is
made in a good viewing condition, this factor may lead to increased support for the eyewitness’
identification. Contrary to this, if an eyewitness appears to be very confident but has made the
identification in a bad viewing condition, mock jurors appear to weigh the viewing conditions
when determining how confident they are in their verdict.
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CHAPTER IV
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Overall, Study 1 and Study 2 both replicated the featural justification effect found in
previous research (Dodson & Dobolyi, 2015, 2017, 2018). Results from the two studies supports
the theory that the featural justification effect is a strong, unwavering effect in the case of
eyewitness confidence statements. In the current study, mock jurors were not provided with a
photo lineup of the identification, as Cash and Lane (2020) found the effect to be present even
without a photo lineup. The current studies support this finding, as the featural justification effect
was found to be significant in both Study 1 and Study 2. Eyewitnesses in confidence only
conditions were consistently perceived to be more confident than eyewitnesses who made
statements referencing the suspect’s nose. This finding is not surprising, as previous research on
the effect has consistently found the featural justification effect present when comparing
eyewitness statements with and without featural references (Dodson & Dobolyi, 2015, 2017,
2018; Slane & Dodson, 2019).
Another similar finding for both studies was the effect of viewing condition on verdict.
Jurors appeared to be sensitive to the manipulation of good and bad eyewitness factors and took
these factors into account when making verdict decisions. Results were that good viewing
conditions elicited more guilty verdicts than bad viewing conditions. Since this effect was found
in Study 1, where expert testimony did not have an effect on verdict, the finding of viewing
condition on verdict suggests mock jurors in this case were aware of the discrepancies between
the good and bad viewing conditions without needing to be informed on the specific factors, such
as duration and lighting.

41

Several main effects were found to be significant in Study 2 that were not found in Study
1. Study 2 yielded a main effect of viewing condition on perceived confidence, in that
eyewitnesses that made statements from good viewing conditions were reported to be higher in
confidence than eyewitnesses in bad viewing conditions. In Study 1, good viewing conditions
resulted in a confidence rating of 84.10%, while in Study 2 good viewing conditions had a mean
rating of 88.52%. A potential explanation for this significant finding in Study 2 is that the
participants in Study 2 were more sensitive of eyewitness conditions, potentially due to less
information provided in the jury instructions compared to the expert testimony from Study 1, and
thus the eyewitness factors were more salient to them when rating the eyewitness’ confidence.
In addition, a main effect of viewing condition on confidence in verdict was observed in
Study 2, an effect not found in Study 1. The finding that good viewing conditions resulted in
higher confidence in verdict than bad viewing conditions (Study 2) suggests mock jurors were
sensitive to the eyewitness conditions and took these into account not only when rendering a
verdict, but also when reporting confidence in their verdict. Throughout both studies, jurors were
sensitive to eyewitness factors, being that the quality of the viewing condition had a significant
effect on verdict. Then, when asked to rate how confident jurors were in their verdict, mock
jurors in Study 2 may have recalled the conditions of the case when assessing verdict confidence.
With the bad viewing condition having added factors such as poor lighting, a briefer duration of
exposure to the suspect, and the suspect wearing a hoodie, mock jurors may have determined
these factors to influence the reliability of the eyewitness’ identification. The studies aimed to
add to the literature on the featural justification effect by including potential safeguards to
educate jurors in attempts to lessen the featural justification effect. One of the aims of Study 1
was to explore the potential effect of expert testimony on the influence of the featural
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justification effect, as previous research has not examined if expert testimony can alleviate jurors
discrediting these eyewitnesses. In Study 1, there was not an effect of expert testimony on jurors’
decisions. A possible reason for this is that jurors were not thoroughly processing the
information or skimmed through the expert testimony. However, in Study 2 there was an effect
of jury instruction on verdict. Perhaps mock jurors were more likely to pay attention to jury
instructions than the expert testimony because of the connotation that expert testimony was being
provided by an individual person and thus created speculation on the credibility of this expert.
Jury instructions, on the other hand, are provided by the court and may appear to be more factual
and objective. Another factor that may explain a lack of significance for expert testimony, and
jury instruction in most conditions, is that the expert testimony and jury instructions were
provided to participants in a written transcript form. In a real case, an expert witness will testify
and speak in front of the jurors, which may demand more attention than written instructions.
Based on past research that finds mixed results on the effectiveness of expert testimony, the
insignificant findings are not unprecedented (Houston et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2017; Salerno et
al., 2017, but see Wise & Kehn, 2020).
In addition, past literature has shown mixed results on the effectiveness of jury
instructions (Baguley et al., 2017; Jones et al., 2017; Jones et al., 2020). In Study 2, jury
instruction had a significant effect on verdict. As hypothesized, enhanced jury instruction led to
an increase in not guilty verdicts compared to standard jury instruction. The enhanced jury
instructions provided mock jurors with more information relevant to the case vignette,
specifically discussing an array of eyewitness factors that could influence the accuracy of an
eyewitness. The results suggest jurors were able to apply these instructions when rendering a
verdict.
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The current studies are not without limitations. The aim of the expert testimony and jury
instruction was to sensitize jurors to eyewitness factors in the viewing conditions, as well as the
featural justification effect. The order in which information was provided in the current studies
may not have been structured to influence or minimize the featural justification effect. If jurors
had been educated on the prevalence of featural justifications before reading about the
eyewitness statement, this could have affected ratings of perceived confidence. However, at the
same time, this presentation of events may have alerted participants to what the study was
examining.
The current study failed to measure Need for Cognition (NFC) in participants, which may
have provided insight to explain the difference in findings between Study 1 and Study 2. For
instance, it could be that in Study 2 consisted of more participants that would score high in NFC
than Study 1, where expert testimony did not have an effect. However, this can only be
speculated on, as this was not a measure examined in the study.
The results of expert testimony and jury instruction align with previous research that
finds mixed results on the effectiveness of these safeguards. In the case of this study, the
instructions were provided through a written transcript. In a real trial, providing instructions
verbally and in written-form could increase the application of these instructions. Still, it may be
that the featural justification effect is a robust effect that is impermeable to be alleviated by
educating jurors. In the case of this study, jurors were provided with information about
eyewitness statements after reading the statement and providing a confidence rating. A future
study could examine if the effect would still be present if the order was switched, so that jurors
are first made aware of featural justifications and provided with information informing jurors
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that referencing a feature does not necessitate diminishing the confidence or accuracy of an
eyewitness.
As discussed previously, a photo lineup was not provided to mock jurors in these studies,
as Cash and Lane (2020) found the featural justification effect to be present despite mock jurors
not having a photo lineup to assess. One could hypothesize the featural justification would have
had a larger effect if a photo lineup was provided to mock jurors, as this was the conclusion Cash
and Lane (2020) made in their study. Regardless, this study suggests that even without a photo
lineup to make comparisons, the mere mention of a single facial feature leads jurors to interpret
the eyewitness as less confident. In general, a limitation of studies that attempt to mirror a trial is
that it cannot encompass all the details and time that a real trial would entail. Having participants
read a written transcript of a case will not be the same as being a jury in a real-world trial where
the jury hear significantly more information and deliberate together over possible verdicts. Still,
the written transcript of the case vignette and eyewitness confidence statements have been used
in previous research that aims to have findings relevant for real-world applications (Dodson &
Dobolyi, 2015, 20117, 2017; Cash & Lane, 2020; Slane & Dodson, 2019).
Nevertheless, the results from these studies have important implications for real cases
where eyewitness evidence is provided to jurors. As the featural justification effect was found to
be prominent in both studies, which is consistent with previous research, it is important to note
for attorneys that an eyewitness identification statement that references a feature will most likely
be interpreted by the jury to be less confident. In one of Dodson and Dobolyi’s (2018) studies
where participants were asked to give statements when identifying a suspect, 50% of those
statements referenced a single facial feature, or multiple features when justifying one’s
identification. Clearly, eyewitnesses will continue to make featural statements when identifying a
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suspect. As eyewitness evidence is a piece of evidence jurors assign weight to in a case, a
statement referencing a feature could be given less weight or influence when it comes to
decision-making or deliberation. Thus, it is important for judges, attorneys, and others in the
legal system to be aware of how an eyewitness statement may be interpreted, and thus influence
decisions juries make in a case. As previous research suggests judges, attorneys, and others
involved in legal decision making may not have the knowledge that expert witnesses do on
eyewitness testimony, research should continue to examine effective ways of informing jurors on
these issues (Benton et al., 2006; Wise & Safer, 2004, 2010)
The two studies support previous studies on the featural justification effect that find the
effect to be a prominent result of an eyewitness using features to justify their identification
(Dodson & Dobolyi, 2015, 2017, 2018; Slane & Dodson, 2019). The current studies aimed to
address a gap in the literature by attempting to lessen the effect by providing mock jurors with
expert testimony or jury instruction. Although the current studies found mixed effects with these
safeguards, future research could explore the timing of when these safeguards are provided to
examine if a different order of presentation could influence decisions. From this research, a key
takeaway is that those working within the legal system should be aware of how an eyewitness’
credibility may be perceived, given the eyewitness references facial features. Awareness of this
effect and how to mitigate how jurors perceive an eyewitness will be important in real-world
cases, especially when eyewitness evidence is a significant piece of evidence in a case.
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Table 1
Study 1 Demographics
n
Characteristic
Age
Gender
Male
Female
Race
White
Black or African American
Asian
Education
High School
Associate’s
Bachelor’s
Master’s
Political Orientation
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
U.S. Citizen
Yes
No

%

132
203

38.9
59.9

272
26
25

80.2
7.7
7.4

30
36
146
26

8.8
10.6
43.1
7.7

143
93
103

42.2
27.4
30.4

332
7

97.9
2.1

Note. N = 339.
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M

SD

44.23

13.69

Table 2
Study 1 Perceived Confidence Estimates
95% CI
Condition
Confidence Only
Unobservable
Featural

M
87.82
80.98
81.81

SE
1.59
1.59
1.58

Note. N = 339.

56

LL
84.69
77.87
78.70

UL
90.95
84.10
84.91

Table 3
Study 1 Verdict Parameter Estimates
95% CI
Variable
Viewing Condition
Viewing Condition
(X1)
Confidence
Confidence (X1)
Confidence (X2)
Expert Testimony
Expert Testimony (X1)
Expert Testimony (X2)

b

SE

Wald x

-0.80

0.22

-0.12
-0.22

0.27
0.27

-0.34
-0.17

0.27
0.27

p

LL

UL

12.95 (1)

< .001

0.29

0.69

0.64 (2)
0.19 (1)
0.64 (1)
1.60 (2)
1.60 (1)
0.39 (1)

.725
.663
.423
.450
.206
.532

0.52
0.47

1.52
1.37

0.42
0.50

1.21
1.44

Note. N = 339, Degrees of freedom in parentheses.
X1: Good viewing; Confidence Only; Standard Expert
X2: Unobservable; Enhanced Expert
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Table 4
Study 1 Count for Main Effect of Viewing on Verdict
Verdict
Viewing Condition
Good
Bad
Total

Not Guilty
70
106
176

Guilty
97
66
163

Note. N = 339.
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Total
167
172
339

Table 5
Study 1 Estimates for Three-Way Interaction on Confidence in Verdict

Viewing
Good

Confidence
Confidence Only

Unobservable

Featural

Bad

Confidence Only

Unobservable

Featural

Expert Testimony
Standard
Enhanced
Enhanced +
Standard
Enhanced
Enhanced +
Standard
Enhanced
Enhanced +
Standard
Enhanced
Enhanced +
Standard
Enhanced
Enhanced +
Standard
Enhanced
Enhanced +

Note. N = 339.
*p = .002; **p = .014
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M
6.37
5.89
7.05*
5.74
6.18
6.00
6.37
6.95**
6.33
5.84
6.85
5.18*
6.28
6.05
6.35
6.14
5.50**
6.16

SE
0.41
0.42
0.41
0.41
0.43
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.42
0.41
0.39
0.43
0.42
0.40
0.40
0.39
0.42
0.41

95% CI
LL
UL
5.57
7.17
5.06
6.71
6.25
7.86
4.93
6.54
5.33
7.03
5.20
6.80
5.57
7.17
6.15
7.75
5.51
7.16
5.04
6.65
6.07
7.63
4.32
6.03
5.45
7.10
5.27
6.83
5.57
7.13
5.38
6.91
4.68
6.33
5.36
6.96

Table 6
Study 2 Demographics
n
Characteristic
Age
Gender
Male
Female
Race
White
Black or African American
Asian
Education
High School
Associate’s
Bachelor’s
Master’s
Political Orientation
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
U.S. Citizen
Yes
No

%

74
125

36.5
61.6

162
18
13

79.8
8.9
6.4

21
26
68
31

10.3
12.8
33.5
15.3

92
55
56

45.3
27.1
27.6

199
4

98.0
2.0

Note. N = 203.

60

M

SD

43.56

13.13

Table 7
Study 2 Viewing Condition on Perceived Confidence Estimates
95% CI
Condition
Good Viewing
Bad Viewing

M
88.52
83.72

SE
1.75
1.74

Note. N = 203.

61

LL
85.07
80.29

UL
91.96
87.14

Table 8
Study 2 Confidence Type on Perceived Confidence Estimates
95% CI
Condition
Confidence Only
Featural

M
89.55
82.89

SE
1.76
1.70

Note. N = 203.

62

LL
86.09
79.54

UL
93.01
86.23

Table 9
Study 2 Verdict Parameter Estimates
95% CI
Variable
Viewing Condition
Viewing Condition
(X1)
Confidence
Confidence (X1)
Jury Instruction
Jury Instruction (X1)

b

SE

Wald x

-1.57

0.31

-0.38
-0.61

2

p

LL

UL

25.10 (1)

< .001

0.11

0.38

0.31

1.56 (1)

.212

0.37

1.25

0.31

3.86 (1)

.049

0.30

1.00

Note. N = 203, Degrees of freedom in parentheses.
X1: Good viewing; Confidence Only; Standard Jury Instruction
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Table 10
Study 2 Count for Main Effect of Viewing on Verdict

Verdict
Not Guilty
Guilty
Total

Viewing Condition
Good
Bad
36
65
73
29
109
94

Note. N = 203.

64

Total
101
102
203

Table 11
Study 2 Count for Main Effect of Jury Instruction on Verdict
Verdict
Jury Instruction
Standard
Enhanced
Total

Not Guilty
49
60
109

Guilty
54
40
94

Note. N = 203.

65

Total
103
100
203

Table 12
Study 2 Estimates for Two-Way Interaction on Confidence in Verdict
95% CI
Viewing
Good
Bad

Confidence
Confidence Only
Featural
Confidence Only
Featural

M
7.21*
6.50*
6.20
6.54

Note. N = 203.
*p = .034

66

SE
0.24
0.23
0.24
0.23

LL
6.74
6.05
5.73
6.09

UL
7.68
6.95
6.66
7.00

Figure 1
Confidence type x viewing x enhanced + expert testimony on confidence in verdict
9

Confidence in Verdict

8
7
6
5
4

Good Viewing

3

Bad Viewing

2
1
0

Confidence Only

Unobservable
Confidence Type

Featural

Note. Three-way interaction on confidence in verdict (Study 1).
Error bars represent standard error.
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Figure 2
Confidence type x viewing x enhanced expert testimony on confidence in verdict

8

Confidence in Verdict

7
6
5
4

Good Viewing

3

Bad Viewing

2
1
0
Confidence

Unobservable

Featural

Confidence Type

Note. Three-way interaction on confidence in verdict (Study 1).
Error bars represent standard error.
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Figure 3
Confidence only x viewing condition on confidence in verdict

9
8
7

6
5
4
3
2

1
Good Viewing

Bad Viewing

Note. Two-way interaction on Confidence in Verdict (Study 2).
Error bars represent standard error.
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Appendix A:
Case Vignette
(Good Viewing)
The defendant was charged with robbery at a neighborhood home at 9:30 PM.
The main witness was a man who saw his neighbor’s house getting broken into while his
neighbors were away on vacation. The witness testified he was on a night run when he saw
someone leaving the side of the house. He did not approach the individual but watched as the
defendant allegedly exited the driveway and ran down the street and turned the corner. At one
point the witness ran right by the alleged robber.
The Prosecution also called the police officer who attended the scene. The officer said he spoke
to the witness, who described the event and offender. The witness told the officer the defendant
was probably twenty feet away from him and that there was good street lighting. The witness
said from the beginning of noticing the suspect, to the defendant running in front of him it was
about five minutes. The eyewitness told the officer he had 20/20 vision.
The officer testified that the witness was shown a photo-lineup that included the defendant’s
photo, and that the witness subsequently selected the defendant from the photo-lineup.
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Case Vignette (bad viewing condition)

The defendant was charged with robbery at a neighborhood home at 9:30 PM.
The main witness was a man who saw his neighbor’s house getting broken into while his
neighbors were away on vacation. The witness testified he was on a night run when he saw
someone wearing a hoodie leaving the side of the house. He did not approach the individual but
watched as the defendant allegedly exited the driveway and ran down the street and turned the
corner. At one point the witness ran right by the alleged robber.
The Prosecution also called the police officer who attended the scene. The officer said he spoke
to the witness, who described the event and offender. The witness told the officer the defendant
was probably twenty feet away from him and it was dark out. He could see the defendant put
something that looked like a gun in the pocket of his hoodie as he was exiting the house, which
caused him to be more stressed. The witness said from the beginning of noticing something
suspicious to the defendant running in front of him it was about two minutes. The eyewitness
told the officer he had 20/20 vision.
The officer testified that the witness was shown a photo-lineup that included the defendant’s
photo, and that the witness subsequently selected the defendant from the photo-lineup.
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Appendix B:
Confidence Statements

Witness statement at time of identification:
“I am very confident it was him.” (Confidence only)
“I am very confident it was him. He looks like someone I know.” (Unobservable justification)
“I am very confident it was him. I recognize his hair/nose/chin” (Featural justification)
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Appendix C:
Expert Testimony Transcripts
Standard Expert Testimony
Dr. Hull holds a PhD in Psychology. After Dr. Hull was qualified as an expert the following
testimony was given.
Dr. Hull testified:

In order for an eyewitness to make an identification of a suspect, they must have a
memory for that event in which they saw the individual. However, the memory one has can be
altered and confused by different variables. Research has shown us memory is not like a video
recording that an eyewitness can simply replay when recalling the crime. Memory is far more
complex. It is an active, ongoing, reconstructive process. In other words, each time an
eyewitness recalls a crime the eyewitness has to reconstruct his or her memory of what
happened. In reconstructing the crime, the eyewitness may unknowingly draw on other memories
and information that he or she knows in trying to recreate the crime.
Eyewitness identification in criminal cases is very different from recognizing one’s
friends and acquaintances. We are very good at recognizing familiar faces. Repeated exposures
to the faces, plus the context of the encounter, can serve to make recognition of familiar faces
very reliable. Recognition of once-seen faces, however, is a very different matter. Good
memory for a face is not accomplished instantaneously. Faces are complex stimuli and a single
exposure to a face may be insufficient to encode the features of a face in a way that will allow us
to recognize that person later. Although nothing may appear more convincing than an eyewitness
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who is completely confident that he or she has made an accurate identification, you must
carefully evaluate eyewitness evidence. An eyewitness may be mistaken even when the
eyewitness is testifying honestly and in good faith.
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Enhanced Expert Testimony

Dr. Hull holds a Ph.D. in Psychology. After Dr. Hull was qualified as an expert the following
testimony was given.
Dr. Hull testified:

In order for an eyewitness to make an identification of a suspect, they must have a
memory for that event in which they saw the individual. However, the memory one has can be
altered and confused by different variables. Research has shown us memory is not like a video
recording that an eyewitness can simply replay when recalling the crime. Memory is far more
complex. It is an active, ongoing, reconstructive process. In other words, each time an
eyewitness recalls a crime the eyewitness has to reconstruct his or her memory of what
happened. In reconstructing the crime, the eyewitness may unknowingly draw on other memories
and information that he or she knows in trying to recreate the crime.
Eyewitness identification in criminal cases is very different from recognizing one’s
friends and acquaintances. We are very good at recognizing familiar faces. Repeated exposures
to the faces, plus the context of the encounter, can serve to make recognition of familiar faces
very reliable. Recognition of once-seen faces, however, is a very different matter. Good
memory for a face is not accomplished instantaneously. Faces are complex stimuli and a single
exposure to a face may be insufficient to encode the features of a face in a way that will allow us
to recognize that person later. Although nothing may appear more convincing than an eyewitness
who is completely confident that he or she has made an accurate identification, you must
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carefully evaluate eyewitness evidence. An eyewitness may be mistaken even when the
eyewitness is testifying honestly and in good faith.
Eyewitness factors during the crime can affect eyewitness’s accuracy. The presence of a
weapon can lead to weapon focus; this occurs because of the tendency to focus on the weapon,
directing attention away from the criminal’s face. The presence of a weapon can also lead to high
stress levels, which can reduce the ability to remember specific details of an event. A hat or a
hood can also decrease accuracy because it can conceal the criminal’s hair and facial shape,
which can be helpful cues in identifying a person. The length of the crime, or duration, also can
impact the eyewitness’ accuracy. In general, the more time an eyewitness has to observe the
person committing the crime, the more likely the identification will be accurate.
Further, distance between the eyewitness and the person committing a crime can have an
influence on the identification; in general, the greater the distance, the higher the risk of an
incorrect identification. Crimes that occur at night, or in poor lighting, can increased the risk of a
mistaken identification.
From these factors described, research has allowed for us to define what is considered a
strong case for an eyewitness or a weak case. A weak case would be a crime that has many of
these factors described above, for example, an eyewitness viewing a crime that happened for a
short amount of time, at night, where they saw a weapon in the offender’s hand. This kind of
condition could weaken the strength of their memory when asked to complete a lineup
identification. On the other hand, a strong condition, or good viewing condition, for an
eyewitness would be an event where there was a significant portion of time the offender was in
view of the eyewitness, during the day, and the offender was not wearing anything to obstruct

76

their face such as a hat or hood. In this condition, the eyewitness may have a stronger memory
for what the suspect looked like and be more accurate in picking them from a lineup.
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Enhanced + Expert Testimony

Dr. Hull holds a Ph.D. in Psychology. After Dr. Hull was qualified as an expert the following
testimony was given.
Dr. Hull testified:

In order for an eyewitness to make an identification of a suspect, they must have a
memory for that event in which they saw the individual. However, the memory one has can be
altered and confused by different variables. Research has shown us memory is not like a video
recording that an eyewitness can simply replay when recalling the crime. Memory is far more
complex. It is an active, ongoing, reconstructive process. In other words, each time an
eyewitness recalls a crime the eyewitness has to reconstruct his or her memory of what
happened. In reconstructing the crime, the eyewitness may unknowingly draw on other memories
and information that he or she knows in trying to recreate the crime.
Eyewitness identification in criminal cases is very different from recognizing one’s
friends and acquaintances. We are very good at recognizing familiar faces. Repeated exposures
to the faces, plus the context of the encounter, can serve to make recognition of familiar faces
very reliable. Recognition of once-seen faces, however, is a very different matter. Good
memory for a face is not accomplished instantaneously. Faces are complex stimuli and a single
exposure to a face may be insufficient to encode the features of a face in a way that will allow us
to recognize that person later. Although nothing may appear more convincing than an eyewitness
who is completely confident that he or she has made an accurate identification, you must
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carefully evaluate eyewitness evidence. An eyewitness may be mistaken even when the
eyewitness is testifying honestly and in good faith.
Eyewitness factors during the crime can affect eyewitness’s accuracy. The presence of a
weapon can lead to weapon focus; this occurs because of the tendency to focus on the weapon,
directing attention away from the criminal’s face. The presence of a weapon can also lead to high
stress levels, which can reduce the ability to remember specific details of an event. A hat or a
hood can also decrease accuracy because it can conceal the criminal’s hair and facial shape,
which can be helpful cues in identifying a person. The length of the crime, or duration, also can
impact the eyewitness’ accuracy. In general, the more time an eyewitness has to observe the
person committing the crime, the more likely the identification will be accurate.
Further, distance between the eyewitness and the person committing a crime can have an
influence on the identification; in general, the greater the distance, the higher the risk of an
incorrect identification. Crimes that occur at night, or in poor lighting, can increased the risk of a
mistaken identification.
When making an identification, an eyewitness may describe features of the suspect that
distinguished them from others in the lineup. These features pointed out may be the suspect’s
chin, hair, nose, or even facial expression. Other times, an eyewitness picks a suspect out of a
lineup without providing this information as justification for the selection of the suspect.
Research has shown jurors tend to discredit the confidence of eyewitnesses who include a
specific feature as identifying, even though an eyewitness who provides a facial feature is not
necessarily any less accurate than an eyewitness who does not. This is because a juror may look
at a photo of the lineup and believe the feature mentioned is not distinguishable among the
people in the group; however, this is an individual difference that does not mean the eyewitness
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did not find the feature to be distinct, and was able to make a correct identification from
assessing this feature in the lineup.
From these factors described, research has allowed for us to define what is considered a
strong case for an eyewitness or a weak case. A weak case would be a crime that has many of
these factors described above, for example, an eyewitness viewing a crime that happened for a
short amount of time, at night, where they saw a weapon in the offender’s hand. This kind of
condition could weaken the strength of their memory when asked to complete a lineup
identification. On the other hand, a strong condition, or good viewing condition, for an
eyewitness would be an event where there was a significant portion of time the offender was in
view of the eyewitness, during the day, and the offender was not wearing anything to obstruct
their face such as a hat or hood. In this condition, the eyewitness may have a stronger memory
for what the suspect looked like and be more accurate in picking them from a lineup.
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Appendix D:
Jury Instruction Transcripts
Standard Jury Instructions

Reasonable doubt is doubt based upon reason and common sense, and may arise from
careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, a conflict in the evidence, or from a lack
of evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof of such a convincing character that a
reasonable person, after careful consideration, would not hesitate to rely and act upon that proof
in life’s most important decisions. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you
firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt.
If you have a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty. If you have no
reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty. It is up to you to decide what evidence
is reliable. You should use your common sense in deciding, which is the best evidence, and
which evidence should not be relied upon in considering your verdict. You may find some of
the evidence is not reliable or less reliable than other evidence. You should consider how the
witness acted as well as what they said. Some things you should consider are: Did the witness
seem to have an opportunity to see and know the things about which the witness testified? Did
the witness seem to have an accurate memory? You may rely on your own conclusions about
the witness. A juror may believe or disbelieve all or any part of the evidence or the testimony of
any witness.
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Enhanced Jury Instructions:
A reasonable doubt may arise from careful and impartial consideration of all the
evidence, a conflict in the evidence, or from a lack of evidence. If you have a reasonable doubt,
you should find the defendant not guilty. If you have no reasonable doubt, you should find the
defendant guilty. It is up to you to decide what evidence is reliable. You should use your
common sense in deciding, which is the best evidence, and which evidence should not be relied
upon in considering your verdict. You may find some of the evidence is not reliable or less
reliable than other evidence. Some things you should consider are: Did the witness seem to have
an opportunity to see and know the things about which the witness testified? Did the witness
seem to have an accurate memory?
It is your job to determine whether the eyewitness’s identification of the defendant is
reliable and believable, or whether it is based on a mistake or for any reason is not worthy of
belief. Human memory is not foolproof. Research has shown that memory is not like a video
recording that an eyewitness can simply replay when recalling the crime. Memory is far more
complex. It is an active, ongoing, reconstructive process. In other words, each time an
eyewitness recalls a crime the eyewitness has to reconstruct his or her memory of what
happened. In reconstructing the crime, the eyewitness may unknowingly draw on other memories
and information that he or she knows in trying to recreate the crime.
Eyewitness identification in criminal cases is very different from recognizing one’s
friends and acquaintances. We are very good at recognizing familiar faces. Repeated exposures
to the faces, plus the context of the encounter, can serve to make recognition of familiar faces
very reliable. Recognition of once-seen faces, however, is a very different matter. Good
memory for a face is not accomplished instantaneously. Faces are complex stimuli and a single
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exposure to a face may be insufficient to encode the features of a face in a way that will allow us
to recognize that person later. Although nothing may appear more convincing than an eyewitness
who is completely confident that he or she has made an accurate identification, you must
carefully evaluate eyewitness evidence. An eyewitness may be mistaken even when the
eyewitness is testifying honestly and in good faith.
Eyewitness factors during the crime can affect eyewitness’s accuracy. The presence of a
weapon can lead to weapon focus; this occurs because of the tendency to focus on the weapon,
directing attention away from the criminal’s face. The presence of a weapon can also lead t o high
stress levels, which can reduce the ability to remember specific details of an event. A hat or a
hood can also decrease accuracy because it can conceal the criminal’s hair and facial shape,
which can be helpful cues in identifying a person. The length of the crime, or duration, also can
impact the eyewitness’ accuracy. The more time an eyewitness has to observe the person
committing the crime, the more likely the identification will be accurate.
Further, distance between the eyewitness and the person committing a crime can have an
influence on the identification; in general, the greater the distance, the higher the risk of an
incorrect identification. Crimes that occur at night, or in poor lighting, can increased the risk of a
mistaken identification. Lastly, research shows that eyewitness confidence is not always a
reliable indicator of accuracy when it comes to identifications; a highly confident eyewitness can
still make an incorrect identification, due to the factors described.
Given the fallibility and potential eyewitness factors described, it is up to you to decide
whether the conditions of the crime potentially increase or decrease the accuracy of the
eyewitness’ confidence and identification.
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Appendix E:
Confidence Scale
Translate the eyewitness’s verbal expression of confidence into a number.
0

20

40

60

Not at all certain

80

100
Completely certain
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Appendix F
Verdict Confidence and Sentencing Scale

1. Please enter your verdict in the present case for the charge of robbery for the defendant.
a. Not Guilty

b. Guilty

2. Using the scale below, how confident are you in your verdict?
Not at all
Confident
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

85

8

9

Very
Confident
______________

Appendix G
Manipulation Check/Demographics

Rate the effectiveness of the Expert testimony provided: (Study 1)

1

2

3

4

Not at all

5

6

7

8

Neutral

9
Very

Rate the effectiveness of the Jury Instructions provided: (Study 2)

1
Not at all

2

3

4

5

6

Neutral
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7

8

9
Very

Rate the following eyewitness factors on how they contribute to identification:

Poor lighting
-4
-3
Leads to False
Identification

-2

-1

0
Neutral

1

2

3

4
Leads to Accurate
Identification

-2

-1

0
Neutral

1

2

3

4
Leads to Accurate
Identification

-2

-1

0
Neutral

1

2

3

4
Leads to Accurate
Identification

-2

-1

0
Neutral

1

2

3

4
Leads to Accurate
Identification

-2

-1

0
Neutral

1

2

3

4
Leads to Accurate
Identification

-2

-1

0
Neutral

1

2

3

4
Leads to Accurate
Identification

Weapon present
-4
-3
Leads to False
Identification

Short duration of crime
-4
-3
Leads to False
Identification

Short distance from suspect
-4
-3
Leads to False
Identification

Suspect wearing a hoodie/mask
-4
-3
Leads to False
Identification

Good vision
-4
-3
Leads to False
Identification
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Manipulation Check

The suspect had a weapon________________________________________True/False
The lighting was good at the time of the crime________________________True/False
The eyewitness reported having 20/20 vision_________________________True/False
The suspect was reported wearing a hoodie___________________________True/False
The duration of the crime was 2 minutes._____________________________True/False
The eyewitness was moderately confident. ___________________________True/False
The eyewitness witnessed a car break-in._____________________________True/False
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Participant Characteristics
Please provide the following information. All information collected will be kept anonymous and
confidential.
1. What is your age in years? _________________________
2. Gender (check all that apply): ____ Man ____ Woman ____
____Queer ____ Nonbinary ____Other (please specify)_____________
3. Do you identify as trans (your gender does not correspond to the sex you were assigned at birth):
__Yes __No
4. Race (check the best response for you): ____American Indian/Alaskan Native
____Asian/Pacific Islander ____Black/African American ____White ___North African/Middle
Eastern
____ Mixed race) ____Other (please specify)______________
5. Ethnicity (check one): ____Hispanic/Latinx ____White/non-Hispanic
____Other (please specify)________
6. Sexual identity (check all that apply): ____Gay ____Lesbian ____Straight ____Bisexual
____Queer ____Questioning ____Pansexual ____Asexual ____Prefer no label
____Other (please specify)________
7. What is your highest educational level? (check one):
____Informal Education
____Trade School or Other Education (specify) __________________
____Less than high school ____Some high school ____High school diploma/GED ____Associates
degree ____Bachelor’s degree ____Master’s degree ____Doctoral degree (including MD, JD)
8. With which, if any, political party or affiliation do you identify? (check one):
____Republican ____Democratic ____Libertarian ____Independent ____Green Party
____None ____Other (please specify): ________________
9. With what, if any, religious or spiritual affiliation do you most identify (check all that apply):
____Jewish ____Catholic ____Protestant ____Methodist ____Baptist ____Christian (other)
____Muslim ____Buddhist ____Atheist ____Agnostic ____Polytheist
____Other (please specify):____________
10. Are you currently, or have you ever been, a member of the US military? (check one):
____Yes, current service member
____Yes, veteran
____No

11. Are you a U.S. Citizen? (circle one):

Yes

No

12. If you are not a U.S. citizen, how long have you lived in the U.S.? (in years)
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